Zero-tolerance policies: do they inhibit or stimulate illicit drug consumption?
Some have suggested fighting the drug problem with so-called « zero-tolerance » policies that impose stiff sanctions for possession of even trace amounts of illicit drugs.
Such policies can swamp the criminal justice system and violate the principle that the punishment should fit the crime, but these objections have often been suppressed by an overriding desire to minimize consumption.
This paper argues to the contrary that under plausible conditions zero-tolerance policies may actually encourage controlled users to consume more, not less, than they would if the punishment increased in proportion to the quantity possessed at the time of arrest.
This result holds even if for every quantity the punishment under the proportional policy is less than or equal to that under the zero-tolerance policy.
Mots-clés Pascal : Substance toxicomanogène, Préparation illicite, Législation, Consommation, Politique sanitaire, Homme, Modèle mathématique
Mots-clés Pascal anglais : Drug of abuse, Illicit preparation, Legislation, Consumption, Health policy, Human, Mathematical model
Notice produite par :
Inist-CNRS - Institut de l'Information Scientifique et Technique
Cote : 93-0463415
Code Inist : 002B30A01C. Création : 199406.