Employee flexible spending accounts for health care represent one component of the current health care financing system that merits serious reform.
These accounts create a system of the undesirable incentives, force employees and employers to take complicated gambles, reduce tax revenues, and fail to meet their purported policy objectives.
This paper describes shortcomings in these accounts from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective.
Some proposed alternatives, including medical spending accounts and zero balance accounts, resolve many of these concerns but not all them.
Mots-clés Pascal : Financement, Employé, Dépense, Santé, Système santé, Etats Unis, Amérique du Nord, Amérique, Homme, Epargne, Compte, Remboursement, Réforme
Mots-clés Pascal anglais : Financing, Employee, Expenditure, Health, Health system, United States, North America, America, Human, Saving
Notice produite par :
Inist-CNRS - Institut de l'Information Scientifique et Technique
Cote : 96-0396280
Code Inist : 002B30A01B. Création : 10/04/1997.